The objective of this paper is to investigate if the effectiveness of the grid pricing system to transmit informative market signals to producers has changed over time. In this study, we evaluate grid market signals by comparing the financial incentive structure of the grid system to the producer's alternative of selling fed cattle by the pen at an average price.
The empirical analysis begins with two pens of cattle (1500 head each). We begin by simulating per head weekly revenue (grid and dressed weight) for each animal and the revenue differential for each animal (grid minus dressed weight). In the next step, weekly pen level average per head revenue and the per head revenue differential are derived. As a result, two data sets are created containing weekly pen level averages for per head revenue and the per head revenue differential for a 381 week period.
The two pens differ with respect to carcass quality but individual animal carcass attributes remained fixed over the timeframe of the study. We employ an EARCH-in-Mean
regression modeling procedure to analyze the variation in the average per head revenue differential for the two pens. The EARCH model is uniquely suited for analyzing the empirical issues associated with marketing risk addressed in this study. The EAR CH term (Nelson 1991) allows for producers' asymmetric response to good vs. bad news. The "Mean term" (Engle, Lilien and Robins 1987) provides an empirical estimator to test for the possibility of a risk premium associated with volatility.
Our empirical results indicate that the incentive to market high (low) quality cattle on a grid (by the pen) has increased (decreased) during the timeframe covered in this study. This finding indicates that the grid pricing system's role as a value based pricing system is strengthening over time. Furthermore, we incorporated the model's conditional variance as an explanatory variable and found that market risk does affect the incentive structure associated with the decision to market on a grid or by the pen. The incorporation of price volatility modeling tools into the grid pricing literature reflects a contribution to the empirical literature on marketing behavior in U.S. livestock markets. Furthermore, they report that grid discounts account for 20% and 49.5% of the market signal for high quality and the low quality cattle groups in their study, respectively. Their findings are consistent with earlier studies that have raised the issue that the GPM premium and discount structure may act as a "barrier to adoption" of grid pricing by producers ( e.g., Fausti and Qasmi
Literature Review

Agricultural economists have investigated a number of issues
2002).
The goal of the VBM initiative is to transform the beef industry's production and marketing system along the entire supply chain. To accomplish this goal, a VBM pricing system needs to capture a dominant share of fed cattle sales. While grid marketing has increased in importance as a pricing method for fed cattle over the last fifteen years, it has not replaced average pricing by the pen as the dominant marketing option selected by fed cattle producers. Conceptually, an important objective of GPM as an integral component of a value based marketing system is to induce fed cattle producers to sell their cattle on a grid. The benefits to producers who sell on a grid touted by the beef industry are: a) producers will be rewarded for the above average cattle they sell on a grid, and b) producers will be given detailed information on the quality of each individual carcass by the packer. Carcass information and the premiums represent the grid market signal to the producer that is absent when cattle are sold at an average price by the pen. In tum, the producer will make adjustments to the production system to improve the carcass quality of animals sold in the future. However, there is also risk the producer must accept. When a producer sells on a grid the producer faces uncertainty concerning the average quality of animals being sold. This uncertainty creates a financial risk 
Data
Carcass data on 2590 slaughter steers was collected from a retained ownership study conducted by South Dakota State University. A random sampling procedure was employed to construct two data sets. The first dataset, labeled "Choice" data, consists of 2/3 choice grade steers and 1 /3 select grade steers, whereas the second dataset "Select" includes 2/3 select grade steers and 1/3 choice grade steers.
1 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the two data sets. The carcass data were used to simulate weekly per-head market values using both a grid pricing system and the hot weight carcass ( Other important factors are also included, such as past revenue differentials, the potential trend in preference for the AMS grid marketing alternative and seasonal price patterns. We propose the follo\.\-ing regression for the revenue differential for the two data sets:
where 
Empirical Results
The summary statistics presented in Table 3 are consistent with the empirical literature on grid pricing. Summary statistics reflect long-run marketing outcomes for two pens of cattle holding carcass quality attributes constant over time. Empirical evidence indicates that higher quality cattle are rewarded on a grid and lower quality cattle are penalized relative to selling at an average pnce. Regardless of cattle carcass quality, revenue variability is higher when marketing on a grid.
The summary statistics also provide insight on the relationship between financial risk and carcass quality uncertainty. Assume the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of his/her cattle and the producer owns both the choice and select pens. Summary statistics provided in Table 3 show that for these two sets of cattle there is an average per-head revenue differential of $23.77 when marketing above average cattle on a grid relative to selling below average cattle on a grid ($963.31 -939.54) . If the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of the cattle he/she is selling, then this revenue differential represents the per-head financial risk the producer faces. On the other hand, comparing revenue from selling below and above average cattle at an average HCW price resulted in only an 84 cent HCWP per-head differential between pens. In this case, the financial risk the producer faces is almost zero. This non-zero differential is the result of the minimal weight difference across pens. These findings are consistent with Anderson and Zeuli (2001: p. 284 ) who concluded that: "Errors in the seller's judgment ofa pen of cattle's quality can have a significant impact on grid pricing returns, while having little or no impact on returns to live pricing.''
The EARCH-in-Mean regression model is estimated using maximum likelihood. The results for the choice and select datasets are reported in the left and right panels of Table 5, respectively. We analyze the regression results before presenting the EAR CH model. All results are compared between the two datasets. In Table 5, On the other hand, for the choice pen, the incentive to market on a grid increases by $1. 77.
These empirical estimates suggest, ceteris paribus, a $1 increase in the yg2 premium increases the producer's incentive to market on a grid regardless of carcass quality expectations.
The final grid price variable included in the model is yield grade 5 (yg5p) and the coefficients are negative in both the choice and the select models. A one dollar increase in the "yg5p" discount will reduce the incentive to se11 the choice pen on a grid by $0.59 and for the select pen, the incentive to market by the pen increases by $0.99. This implies, ceteris paribus, a $1 increase in the yg5p premium reduces the producer's incentive to market on a grid regardless of carcass quality expectations.
One interesting implication from our analysis above suggests that a simultaneous increase in the choice-select discount and the yield grade 1-2 premium will send conflicting market signals to producers of lower quality grade cattle but a positive market signal to producers of higher quality grade cattle. This inherent conflict in the structure of the grid pricing system appears to be a "barrier to adoption" that has not been identified in the previous literature.
Regression Results: Time Trend and Seasonality
The literature has yet to answer the question: is the incentive structure of the grid pricing system evolving over time? The estimated time trend regression coefficients can help address this question. From Table 5 , we find that Tis positive and statistically significant in both models. surrounding the market risk premium (holding its expected value constant), then risk averse sellers will increase their required risk premium to sell on a grid. Thus, ceteris paribus, there will be a subgroup of sellers who will shift from marketing on a grid to marketing by the pen (Fausti et al. 201 2) . Empirical evidence indicates both positive and negative shocks to the revenue differential will increase the level of uncertainty associated with the market risk premium.
This implies that during
On a final note, our discussion of the asymmetric effect of shocks on the conditional variance implies that the level of uncertainty associated with the market risk premium is dependent on cattle quality (Figure l ) . For the select (choice) dataset uncertainty associated with the market risk premium is more sensitive to positive (negative) shocks relative to the choice (select) dataset. We conclude that shocks to the market risk premium will alter risk-averse producers' marketing decisions in a manner consistent with Fausti et al. (2012) : a) A positive price shock will increase the incentive to market on a grid [e.g., if �e t > 0 then �GridRev t -�HCWRev t >OJ. A negative shock will increase the disincentive to market on a grid. These results hold regardless of cattle quality. b) For above average cattle, a positive shock increases the incentive to market on the grid but it also increases the risk. In this case, the effect of the shock is dependent upon the producer's risk preferences. A risk neutral producer will view the positive shock as an increase in the incentive to market on a grid. A risk-averse producer's view will be dependent upon their degree of risk aversion. On the other hand, a negative shock results in an increase in the disincentive to market on the grid but also increases the risk. In this case, the dual effects of a negative price shock are reinforcing. This implies that both risk-neutral and risk-averse producers will view a negative price shock as a weakening of the incentive to market on a grid. c) For below average cattle, a positive shock reduces the disincentive to market on the grid but increases risk so the effect on a producer's marketing decision is dependent on risk preferences. For a negative shock, the disincentive to market on the grid increases and the risk increases. In this case, risk-neutral and risk-averse producers will view a negative price shock as strengthening the disincentive to market on a grid. The last issue to be addressed is the effect of a change in the conditional variance on the market risk premium. Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) introduced the ARCH-in-M model, which allows the conditional variance to affect the mean, to show that a risk-averse investor will demand a risk premium to hold long term bonds relative to short term bonds. In our model, we take the logarithm of conditional variance because it is the only functional form that ensures the normality of the ARCH residual.
7 The volatility effect on the market risk premium is captured by (8), which is statistically significant and negative for both datasets. A simple description of 6 is that it represents the component of the market risk premium due to the uncertainty. A proxy for this uncertainty would be the standard deviations associated with mean values reported for DiffRev in Table 3 for the choice and select datasets. If we assume that the conditional variance is a proxy for the risk, the risk premium (o) associated with logarithm of h 1 is statistically significant and negative for the select and choice datasets. We interpret this result as an indication that sellers of fed cattle are more willing to market their cattle by the pen in order to avoid an even larger penalty on the grid when there is greater uncertainty surrounding the market risk premium. The EARCH model confirms the view in the literature that carcass quality uncertainty injects financial risk into the marketing decision. Thus, increased producer uncertainty over the market risk premium renders their decision to sell cattle on a grid to be inherently risker.
Summary
There are three pricing alternatives that producers have to select from when marketing their fed cattle (live weight, dressed weight, and grid). The coexistence of pen level pricing systems with the individual animal grid pricing system is an obstacle in the path of the beef industry's goal of transforming itself into a value based production and marketing system. Selling cattle at an average price by the pen is still very appealing to producers, who are risk-averse, or lack the financial capital to adopt value based production technology, or lack economies of scale to gain access to marketing outlets that offer a grid pricing alternative (see Fausti et al. 2010 for additional discussion on these issues). However, changes in the grid incentive structure can mitigate these barriers . The empirical evidence suggests that changes in yield grade premiums are more effective in shifting the incentive structure in the direction that is more favorable for marketing on a grid than changes in the select/choice discount for below average quality grade cattle.
The empirical evidence clearly shows how the fi nancial risk of carcass quality uncertainty is injected into producer marketing decisions with respect to selling on a grid versus selling by the pen at an average price. An equally important contribution to the literature is the analysis of how producers react to shocks to the grid incentive mechanism. Evidence suggests that negative shocks reduce the incentive to market on a grid and increase the incentive to market by the pen at an average price. Thus, the financial risk associated with shocks will continue to affect producer marketing decisions and remain a barrier to adoption. However, the adoption of VBM production and marketing technology does offer producers a tool to mitigate their exposure to this type of financial risk.
Finally, empirical results suggest that the grid premium and discount structure is slowly adjusting in a manner that encourages marketing on a grid and discourages marketing by the pen at an average price. If this trend continues, grid market share of steer and heifer slaughter volume should increase in the future.
